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Abstract
The collection of genetic and health information by employers for reasons that are unrelated to the health and
safety of workers is an undue infringement of the right to privacy, and consequently should be firmly
prohibited by statute. Comprehensive genetic and health information privacy requires the protection of at
least three critical elements of the right to privacy-namely choice, secrecy, and confidentiality. While choice
and secrecy protect the individual's right to privacy at the collection stage, confidentiality safeguards this right
at the point of disclosure. Laws that focus on the inappropriate use of genetic and health information without
addressing the act of collecting such information, as is the case with American laws prohibiting genetic
discrimination by employers and others, fail adequately to preserve privacy and prevent discrimination.
Existing laws that do address the collection of personal information, such as Canada's Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), the general and statutory laws of Quebec, and recent
Manitoba legislation are insufficiently explicit with respect to the legality of genetic and health information
collection by employers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a vast computerized infrastructure of biomedical
informatics-as available in Calgary and Phoenix as it is in Atlanta,
Bethesda, and Ottawa-collecting and dispersing epidemiological data at
every medical centre on the continent. The value of this public health
surveillance data would be rivalled only by its enormous value to
biomedical research scientists and clinicians, who could test on a grand
scale new theories on the role of genetics, serology, and symptomatology
in the etiology, prevention, and treatment of disease. This reality is
achievable in the near future. Large pieces of the infrastructure already
exist, but the uniformity and coordination of collection and dissemination
implied in this account do not. And while scientific advancement has always
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churned forward without rigorous coordination, protection of the privacy
of those who provide the genetic and health information from which these
advancements are derived may suffer gravely when gaps appear in the
protection afforded by piecemeal efforts. This is particularly true when
health information becomes available to employers and insurers, who may
use the information in ways that maximize profitability at the expense of
individual and societal interests in protecting privacy and preventing
discrimination.
While a person usually decides to undergo genetic testing for
personal health-related reasons, the information that is derived from
genetic testing can be utilized for purposes unrelated to the prevention or
alleviation of disease and suffering. Legal policy commentators have begun
to question the role of the law in regulating private uses of genetic and
health information. Employers are seeking private genetic and health
information when making hiring or firing decisions and there is a strong
incentive for employers to make the disclosure of this private information
a precondition to the attainment of employment. Likewise, both employers
and insurance companies desire private genetic and health information in
order to distinguish healthy individuals from individuals who are more
likely to develop health-related problems in the future. Once again, there
is a strong incentive for employers and insurance companies to make the
disclosure of this information mandatory since it would enable them to
minimize their costs. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between the
privacy interests of the individual and the commercial interests of
employers and insurers. This article will explore this tension between the
individual's right to privacy and the commercial benefit of genetic and
health information by focusing on the employment situation.
The thesis advanced by this article is that comprehensive health
information privacy requires the protection of at least three critical
elements of the right to privacy-namely choice, secrecy, and
confidentiality. While choice and secrecy protect the individual's right to
privacy at the collection stage, confidentiality safeguards this right at the
point of disclosure. Laws that focus on the inappropriate use of genetic and
health information without addressing the original collection of such
information, as is the case with American laws prohibiting genetic
discrimination by employers and others, fail adequately to preserve privacy
and prevent discrimination. Existing laws that do address the collection of
personal information, such as Canada's Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), the general and statutory laws of
Quebec, and recent Manitoba legislation discussed below, are insufficiently
explicit with respect to the legality of genetic and health information
collection by employers. We take the position that the collection of such
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information by employers for reasons that are unrelated to the health and
safety of workers is neither appropriate nor legitimate, and should
consequently be firmly prohibited by a statutory right to privacy. At least
in the employment context, the interests of individuals in decision making
and information privacy as well as in being free from discrimination should
override the commercial interests of employers in acquiring detailed
information regarding the genetic and actual or perceived medical
constitutions of those they employ.
Part II offers a brief survey of theories and definitions of the right to
privacy. In Part III, the conflict between the right to privacy and genetic
and health information is identified and explored. In Part IV, the three
fundamental aspects of the right to privacy-choice, secrecy, and
confidentiality-are identified and a general framework for comprehensive
legislation is presented. In Part V, the existing legal framework of both the
United States and Canada is presented, analyzed, and criticized.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A variety of theories, definitions, and justifications for privacy and
a legal right to privacy have been offered during the past century. We begin
by presenting a brief survey of theories and definitions that attempt to
explain the nature of the concept of privacy, and will then turn to
justifications that have been provided for the legal enforcement of privacy
as a right. Early theorists proposed that the right to privacy was "like the
right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right
not to be maliciously prosecuted, [and] the right not to be defamed."' In
short, the right to privacy was perceived as an aspect of the right to be let
alone, a right that is so basic that it must emanate directly from the
"4person" or "human dignity." Accordingly, this general right was entitled
the principle of "inviolate personality., 2 The modem version of this theory
I S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at 205
[hereinafter "The Right to Privacy"].
2 See, for example, ibid. at 205: ("The principle which protects personal writings and all other
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form,
is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of inviolate personality"; R. Pound, "Interests
of Personality: Part I" (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343; R. Pound, "Interests of Personality: Part 11" (1915)
28 Harv. L. Rev. 445; and E.J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser" (1964) 39 N.Y.U.I. Rev. 962 at 971 (interpreting "inviolate personality" to mean "the
individual's independence, dignity and integrity"). It is interesting to note that civil law theorists in the
jurisdiction of Quebec have also grounded the privacy interest within the broad principle of "juridical
personality." See Civil Code of Quibec: A Critical Edition/Code civildu Quebec: =dition critique, J.-M.
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of privacy is called the principle of "personhood" and has garnered several
contemporary supporters?
The principle of inviolate personality or personhood has been
criticized by a number of common law scholars as being too imprecise and
all-encompassing to be of any practical assistance. Not surprisingly, most
common law scholars have attempted to find the justification of the right
to privacy elsewhere, for instance, the principle of autonomy5 Contrary to
the theory of inviolate personality or personhood, the right to privacy is not
simply the right to restrict the publication of personal information about
oneself. Rather, while the right to privacy may be used to deter the
publication of personal information, privacy is essentially "control over
when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others." In other
words, privacy is grounded in the principle of autonomy or self-
determination.
However, the autonomy-based theory of privacy has been criticized.
Although, to be sure, the right to privacy safeguards respect for autonomy,
the right to privacy is not itself synonymous with the principle of autonomy
and is in fact better understood as a "state of inaccessibility. ' The right to
privacy promotes respect for autonomy by imparting to the individual a
legal means of preserving and protecting his or her state of inaccessibility.
This protected sphere is an environment in which individuals can think and
act voluntarily, unencumbered by the coercive influence of the outside
world. Persons are in a state of inaccessibility when they, their mental state,
or information about them "is beyond the range of other's five senses and
Brisson & N. Kasirer, eds. (Cowansville, Qua.: Les tditionsYvonsBlaisZ0GD),art. 1 & 3 [hereinafter
Civil Code].
3 See, for example, J.B. Craven, Jr., "Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone" [19761 Duke L.J.
699; J.H. Reiman, "Privey, Intimacy, and Personhood" (1976) 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26; and T. Gerety,
"Redefining Privacy" (1977) Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 2'3.
4 See, for example, W.A. Parent, "Privacy, Morality and the Law" (1933) 12 Phl. & Pub. Aff. 269;
and J. Rubenfeld, "The Right of Privacy" (19S9) 102 Harv. L Rev. 737.
5 See, for example, L Henkin, "Privacy and Autonom,' (1974) 74 Colum. L Rev. 1410; J.A.
Eichbaum, "Tow-rds an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Prhaq,: Beyond the ldeolo yof
Familial Privacy" (1979) 14 Harm. CR.-C.L Rev 361; and J. Feinberg, "Autonomy, Sovereignty, and
Privacy. Moral Ideals in the Constitution?" (1933) 53 Notre Dame L Rev. 445.
6 R.B. Parker,"A Definition of Privacy" (1973-74) 27 Rutgers L Rev, 275 at 231. Sze also, A.F.
Westin,PrvacyandFreedom (NewYork: Atheneum, 1967) at 7 [hereinafterPhazy] (definingprivay
as"theclaim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselvesv.hen,how, and tovhat
extent information about them is communicated to other5").
7 See T.L Beauchamp & J.F. Childress. Pdncipks of Biomedical Eihts, 4th ed. (New York:
Oord University Press, 1994) at 406-12 [hereinafter Btowmcdal Ethics].
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any devices that can enhance, reveal, trace, or record human conduct,
thought, belief or emotion."' The advantage of the inaccessibility definition
is that it offers useful distinctions from which to conceptualize the different
types of privacy losses that individuals may suffer. For instance, individuals
may experience a loss of privacy when their physical state, disposition, or
informational inaccessibility is disturbed by an unauthorized intruder.
A number of justifications have been put forth for the enforcement
of privacy as a legal right. For Westin, a certain degree of privacy
protection is essential in order to ensure liberty and democracy because the
right to privacy restrains the ability of the state to pry into the lives of its
citizens. 9 The right to privacy has also been justified on the basis that it
safeguards what is described as being a number of basic rights, such as the
right not to be looked at, not to be listened to, not to be caused distress, not
to be harmed, hurt, or tortured, and so on." Other justifications for the
right to privacy have included the prevention of prejudice and
stigmatization in society," the maintenance of "degrees of intimacy" in
friendship and love, 12 the argument that privacy is a basic human need,
1 3
and the protection of autonomy. 
4
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE COMMERCIAL INTEREST
IN GENETIC INFORMATION
It is debatable whether genetic information is sufficiently distinct
from other medical information as to justify its special treatment by the
law, such as through the enactment of specific genetic privacy and anti-
8 A.L. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy For Women in a Free Society (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1988) at 15.
9 Privacy, supra note 6 at 7.
10 j.J. Thompson, "The Right to Privacy" (1975) 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 295.
if R. Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 421 at 455.
12 See, for example, C. Fried, "Privacy" (1968) Yale L.J. 475; and C. Fried, "Privacy: A Moral
Analysis" in F.D. Schoeman, ed., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1984) 203.
13 L. Doyal, "Human Need and the Right of Patients to Privacy" (1997) 14 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol'y 1.
14 See Biomedical Ethics, supra note 7.
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discrimination legislation.'5 Those in favour of special legal protection for
genetic information have argued that genetic information, unlike other
medical information, is predictive not only of the individual's medical
future, but also that of his or her first-degree relatives.' 6 These
commentators compare the genome to a "future diary." Despite what
might have been viewed by the donor as a disclosure of genetic material for
a specific purpose, holders of a sample of an individual's DNA will be able
to learn more and more about that individual and his or her family as
medical research continues to unlock the genetic codes that comprise the
human genome. In addition, genetic information is distinguished from
other medical information because it offers uncertain predictions that an
individual may wish to ignore or suppress from the attention of insurers or
employers. This incentive exists because the predictive and therapeutic
value of genetic information is more likely than real-time diagnostic
medical information to be outweighed by long-term anxiety of the
individual or her family, orby the threat of stigmatization or discrimination
at the hands of third parties.
Others have argued against the enactment of special legal
protection for genetic information, referring to this viewpoint as "genetic
exceptionalism."' 7 Mr. Justice Ginsburg has, for instance, expressed the
view that unique legal solutions will lead to reductionism and genetic
determinism, and that the common law is capable of addressing the new
1 5 Many states have already enacted genetic-spcafic legislation, and the Umted States CongrcSs
has attempted to follow suit on numerous occasions. See sections SC and 5D of this article, betlow.
Moreover, George Annas, Patricia Roche, and Leonard Glantz from the Health Law Department of
the Boston University School of Public Health hae drafted a proposed federal law, The Genetic
PdrvacyAct, that is available on the world wide web. See GJ. Annas, L-H. Glantz & P.A. Rehe, The
Genetic Piracy Act and Conmmentary (Boston: Boston Unisersity Scheol of Public Health, 1995),
online: Boston University Medical Campus (http:h wbumc~bu.edu;xwaPiphflvJact~html> date
accessed: 15 October2001). See also, P. Roche, L Glantz & GJ. Annas,"The Genetic Prtwa Act: A
Proposal for National Legislation" (1996)37 Jurimetrics 1.
16See E.T. Juengst, "Priorities in Professional Ethics and Social Policy for Human Genctics"
(1991) 266 J.A.M.A. 1535. The most vociferous proponent of this position has been George Anna3.
See, for example: GJ. Annas, "Privacy Rules for DNA Databants: Protecting Coded'Future Diaries'"
(1993) 270J.A.M.A.2346; GJ. Annas,"Genetic Pracy:There Ought tobe a Lay," (1999)4Tet. Rev.
L & Pol. 9; G.J. Annas, "Genetic Prophecy and Genetic Pn~ac.-Can We Prevent the Dream From
Becoming a Nightmare?" (1995) Am. J. Pub. Health 1196; and GJ. Annas, Some Cho:cc Lat,
Medicine, and the Market (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 97-93. I00-01.
17 SeeT.H. Murray, "Genetic Information and 'Future Diaries'. IsGenctic Information Different
From Other Medical Information" in MA. Rothstein, cd, Genctic Secrets: Pecctmg FnIacy and
Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (New Haven: Yale Univcrsiy Press. 19971 at 69.
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challenges posed by genetic information. ' s The more popular view,
however, is that the enactment of legislation is necessary, but that this
legislation should protect the privacy of all predictive medical information,
whether or not genetic in nature, with equal vigour.'9
These commentators have noted numerous theoretical and
practical difficulties associated with treating genetic data differently from
other sources of health data. First, stricter genetic-specific privacy
standards may significantly restrain the dissemination of genomic data in
relation to other forms of data, thereby curtailing legitimate uses of the
information such as for scientific advancement and drug development.
Second, genomic data may not be more sensitive than, and may therefore
not be deserving of any greater protection than other forms of sensitive
health information such as a diagnosis of HIV infection, sexually transmitted
disease, or mental illness. Third, given that the transmission of electronic
health data, whether for medical consultation, research, or public health,
is seldom limited to one type of information, requiring hospitals, research
institutions, health departments, insurers, and others to maintain separate
records systems or separate security standards for genomic data would be
costly and impracticable. Since these commentators view the difference
between genetic information and other medical information to be one of
degree, not of kind, they propose uniform national privacy protection for
all health information.
Regardless of whether geneticinformation is regarded assuigeneris
or part of the broader category of health information, it raises specific
concerns relating to privacy and discrimination. Genetic technology may be
used to predict, and eventually effectively to treat, cure, or prevent genetic
illnesses. However, genetic technology can also be used for illicit or
questionable purposes. There is preliminary evidence which suggests that
advances in genetic technology will be used to increase employment and
18 D.H. Ginsburg, "Genetics and Privacy" (1999) 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol'y 17.
19 See, for example, LO. Gostin, "Genetic Privacy," (1995) 23 J.L. Med. & Ethics 320 at 326
[hereinafter "Genetic Privacy"]; M.A. Rothstein, "Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They are
so Hard to Protect" (1998) 26 J.L Med. & Ethics 198; J. Beckwith & J.S. Alper, "Reconsidering
Genetic Antidiscrimination Legislation" (1998) 26 J.L. Med. & Ethics 205; R.L. Zimmern, "Genetic
Testing: A Conceptual Exploration" (1999) 25 J. Med. Ethics 151; and T. Lemmens, "Selective Justice,
Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: Should We Single Out Genes in Our Laws" (2000) 45 McGill
L.J. 347 [hereinafter "Selective Justice"].
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insurance discrimination.? Health, life, and long-term care insurance
discrimination might consist of exaggerated premiums or the outright
denial of insurance, while genetically motivated employment discrimination
might include unfavourable treatment in hiring, promotion, compensation,
and assignment of duties, or might even result in the termination of
employees. The risk of discrimination is likely to be higher in jurisdictions
where the costs of health care are largely borne by employers and private
insurers, 1 than it is in jurisdictions that have a publicly funded and
universal health care system." This is so because the financial incentive on
employers and private insurers to attempt to reduce their employee health
care costs by weeding out individuals who are predisposed to developing
serious or costly illnesses later in life is absent in the case of universal
medical systems whose mandate is to provide care to all those in need
regardless of their ability to pay.
20 See, for example, L Ueh, "Genetic Testing and Eclusionaiy Practices in the Workpl!ca"
(1936) 7 J. Pub. Health Poly 37; D. Orentlicher, "Genetic Screening by Emp!ozers" (1930) 263
J.A.LA. 1105; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical A-artation. "U!: of
Genetic Testing by Employers" (1991) 266 J.A.MA. 1327; L Gostin, "Genetic Dtnmmnatian The
Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Emplo ers and Insurers7" (1991) 17 Arm.
J. L & Med. 109 [hereinafter "Genetic Discrimination"J; R. Pokors l. "Genetic Screening and the
Insurance Industry" (1991) 64 Yale J. Bio. Med. 53; P.S. Harpr, "Genetic Testing and Insurance"
(1992) 26 J. Royal College Physicians London 184; P.R Billings ci aL, "Dicnunation as a
Consequence of Genetic Testing" (1993) 52 Am. J. Hum. Genetic- 476; H. Ostrer CaL,"Inmurance
and GeneticTesting: Where Are We Now?" (1993) 52 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 565; K.L, Hud-anciaL,
"Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance:An Urgent Need forReform"n 1995)270 Science 391;
L.N. Geller et aL, "Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Diccrimnation: A CaX2
Study Analysis" (1996) 2 Science & Engineering Ethics 71; EX, Lapham, C Kozma & J O, Vei:,
"Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers" {1'9qb) 274 Science 621; IL RothenbergctaL,
"Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislati'.c Approaches and Pohq Changes" (1997) 275
Science 1755 [hereinafter "Genetic Information and the Workplace"J; K, Birmingham, "Insurers
Admit Genetic Discrimination" (1997) 3:7 Nature Med. 71U; B. Thomson, "Time for Rea=-: msnt
of Use of All Medical Information by UK Insurers" (1990} 352 Lancet 1216; L Lww, S. King & T
Wilkie,"Genetic Discrimination in Life Insurance: Empirical Evidence From aCra.sScctional Sur% ay
of Genetic Support Groups in the United Kingdom" (1993) 317 B.M.J. 1632; E D. Cook, "Gcnetics
and the British Insurance Industry" (1999) 215:2 J. Med. Ethics 157; and C D, Zick C1 aL, "Genetic
Testing, Adverse Selection, and the Demand for Life Insurance" (200) 93'1 Am. J. Mcd. Genetics
29.
21 Such as in the United States. See, for example, P. Fronstin. Fcatures ofE.i nplnwn1 Bft7cd
Heafth Plans (Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1993); and R. Kuttner, "The
American Health Care System: Health Insurance Co'.crage" (1999) 340:2 Ncw Eng, J. Mcd 163,
227 Such as in Canada. See C.D. Na'lor, Canadian Hcalth Care and the State: .4 Centtuy of
Evolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1992). Yet, even in Canada, a lundiction
proclaiming to provide its citizens-with a comprehensnae and univer-al health care plan, approwmatcly
30 per cent of the costs of care are privately paid. See C Fuller, Canng'er Ieofit Hov Coarprattna
are Taking Over Canada's Health Care System (Vancouvcr: New Star Bols, 1993) at 93.
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Since 5 per cent of health care claimants reportedly consume 50 per
cent of the health care resources in any given jurisdiction, and 10 per cent
of claimants reportedly consume 70 per cent of resources, 23 the financial
incentive to identify and exclude costly individuals is significant. This
incentive has existed for insurers ever since the community rating system
of calculating premiums, which holds that all members of a given
community pay comparable rates, was replaced by the experience rating
system, which holds that the cost of insurance is based on expected claims. 4
It is clear, then, that insurers are in the business of identifying those
individuals who are likely to be above average consumers of health care.
Genetic information is an enticing basis upon which to make these
predictions when it comes to genetic illnesses. In jurisdictions where
employers use health benefit packages as a means of attracting qualified
workers, these employers are also likely to be interested in using genetic
information, most notably as a method of determining whether a current
or prospective employee is predisposed to becoming ill in the future. By
avoiding high-risk individuals, employers can expect to reduce their
insurance premiums and minimize productivity losses due to illnesss. Not
surprisingly, many insurance companies and employers feel that genetic
technology provides them with the best available means of reducing costs
and, in so doing, increasing profit.
However, utilizing genetic or health information for these
commercial ends is likely detrimental to the social welfare. First of all,
insofar as insurance companies are entitled to charge high-risk individuals
larger premiums than persons situated in the low-risk category, the practice
of cross-subsidization that renders health insurance affordable to everyone,
including high-risk individuals, will cease. In so doing, high-risk individuals
would be required to pay obscene insurance premiums or simply resolve to
live without insurance. Moreover, where the cost of a treatment for a
genetic disorder are significant, insurance companies may simply deny
coverage to high-risk individuals rather than run the risk of having to pay
for the necessary treatment in the future. As a result, the percentage of the
23 D.W. Light, "The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance" (1992) 267 J.A.M.A.
2503 at 2504.
2 4 See, for example, T.H. Murray, "Genetics and the Moral Mission of Health Insurance" (1992)
22:6 Hastings Cent. Rep. 12; and N.E. Kass, "Insurance for the Insurers: The Use of Genetic Tests"
(1992) 22:6 Hastings Cent. Rep. 6.
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population vAthout medical insurance would likely grow.S Finally,
individuals who are predisposed to costly genetic illnesses may also have
trouble finding and maintaining employment. Employers who are wary of
lost work days and elevated insurance premiums may fail to hire
prospective employees and may discharge current employees who are
identified as being predisposed to costly illnesses, or they may
disproportionately shift their insurance costs onto their genetically
predisposed employees thereby making health care less accessible for that
class of employees.26 The meagre marginal benefit that is obtained by
insurers and employers utilizing genetic and health information would
result in a devastating loss to persons with undesirable genetic
predispositions. For this reason, the practice of identifying and excluding
high-risk individuals must be construed as a form of discrimination.
This conflict between the individual's right to privacy and the
commercial interest in genetic and health information is exacerbated by the
proliferation of information technology. Public health and medical research
are improved when genetic and health information is stored in electronic
form on large networks, because the information becomes easily accessible
to researchers and public health officials. However, given that these very
detailed medical records will be accessible when they are stored in
electronic form, it is all the more clear that there is a need for legislation
that will ensure that the right to privacy is respected
25 There are reportedly forty-four million indikiduals, or 16 rer cent of the populationwithout
health insurance in the United States. See "Critical Condition" lewsucz, 53 (3 Nov'ember 1999),
online: WL (NEWSWEEK) [hereinafter "Critical Condition'].
26 Employers are increasingly engaging in cost shifting tactics such as capping their"total benefit
contribution and thus requiring the employee to trade off health insurance against pension and other
fringe benefits; requiring employees to bear some of the cost of premiums; covering cmplo cesbut not
their family members; offering onlyhealth plans that stringentlycapsome serwessuch as prcseription
drugs and nonemergency outpatient psychiatric benefits; and increasing the amounts of deductible.
or copayments for indemnity and i'Po plans." See R. Kuttner, "The American Health Care Sytem:
Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage" (1999) 340:3 New Eng. J. Mcd 243 at 249.
27 See LO. Gostin et aL, "Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health
Care System" (1995) 5 Health Matrix I at 4--5 C'[tlhe ease of collection, storage, and transmi ion of
data over electronic networks also creates significant risks to pri~acy. Health record, contain a vast
amount of personal information: demographic information such as age, sen, race, and occupatton;
financial information such as employment status, income, disabilities, and participation in federal or
state programs; medical information such as diagnosis, treatment, and disease histories including
mental illness, drug or alcohol dependency, aids, or sexually transmitted diseases (smns); and scical
information such as family, sexual relationships, and lifestyle choices"). See also A.F. Vcstm,
Computes, Health Records, and Citizen Rights (Washington, D.C.: United States; Department of
Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, 1976) at 92-99; National Research Council, Committee
on Maintaining Privacy and Security in Health Care Applications of the National Information
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 39, NO. I
IV. THE THREE PILLARS OF GENETIC AND HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY: CHOICE, SECRECY,
AND CONFIDENTIALITY
To accomplish the objective of comprehensive genetic and health
information privacy, we suggest that each jurisdiction enact a statutory right
to privacy that addresses at least three important aspects: choice, secrecy,
and confidentiality.' The objective that is being pursued here is the modest
purpose of providing a statutory framework to base the protection of
genetic and health information privacy.
Comprehensive genetic and health information privacy requires
legislation that address choice, secrecy, and confidentiality. Choice or
decisionmaking privacy derives from the principles of autonomy and self-
determination and is essentially the right to be unencumbered by an
external authority, such as an employer or insurer, when making personal
choices for oneself, such as submitting to a genetic test. 9 While the
common law right to self-determination could be used to prevent
employers and insurance companies from forcing individuals to submit to
genetic testing, it could not be used to prevent them from making genetic
Infrastructure, For the Record: Protecting Electronic Health Information (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1997). The nature and extent of the threat to privacy in the telecommunications age
will depend on a number of variables, such as whether the health data is collected and stored in
identifiable or non-identifiable form. See "Genetic Privacy,"supra note 19 at 321: "Itlhe most serious
privacy concerns are raised where genomic data are directly linked to a known individual." Another
variable is whether electronic security tools such as personal access codes, encryption programs, and
audit trails are used. These tools are available and could go a long way toward safeguarding the privacy
of health information. See, for example, A. Bakker, "Security in Perspective; Luxury or Must?" (1998)
49:1 Int'l J. Med. Information 31; and F.M. Behlen & S.B. Johnson, "Multicenter Patient Records
Research: Security Policies and Tools" (1999) 6:6 J. Am. Med. Information Ass'n 435.
28 According to the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), there are five elements to the right
to privacy: (1) physical, bodily and psychological integrity and privacy; (2) privacy of personal
information; (3) freedom from surveillance; (4) privacy of personal communications; (5) privacy of
personal space. See Canadian Medical Association, "Health Information Privacy Code" (1998) 159
C.M.A.J. 997, c. C, s. 1 (1). The exact nature of these elements is somewhat unclear and there would
appear to be some overlap between them. Also, while the CMA has identified decisions affecting bodily
integrity as being worthy of privacy protection (element one), its definition of the right to privacy is
similar to Westin's in that it does not address this element but is instead limited to the protection of
personal information. See CMA, ibid., c. B (the right to privacy "includes a patient's right to determine
with whom he or she will share information and to know of and exercise control over use, disclosure
and access concerning any information collected about him or her; it entails the right of consent.
Nonconsensual collection, use, disclosure or access violates the right to privacy, even if it is justified.").
29 In short, it would be an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.": Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 at 599-600 (1977), per Justice Stevens [hereinafter tWhalenI.
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testing a precondition to obtaining or maintaining employment or
insurance status. As a result, persons who exercise their right to autonomy
and refused to undergo testing could find themselves unemployed or
uninsured. Given this unsatisfactory state of affairs, it is clear that simply
safeguarding the right to medical autonomy will not yield comprehensive
protection.
One means of addressing this situation would be to protect the
initial choice and allow discrimination laws to deal with the consequences
of that choice. Qualified individuals who refuse to submit to genetic testing
and are subsequently denied employment or insurance could sue on the
basis of discrimination. However, while discrimination laws offer
comprehensive protection in theory, in practice there are problems
associated with this solution. First, it may be difficult to convince a court
that a denial of benefits on the basis of a refusal to undergo medical testing
constitutes discrimination. Second, it would be difficult to prove that the
denial of benefits had to do with the testing refusal rather than with some
other consideration, such as the quality of the claimant's employment
application. Third, while discrimination laws provide a disincentive, they
are incapable of preventing discrimination. A statutory right to decision-
making privacy would avoid these limitations by outright preventing
employers, insurance companies, and others from requesting, whether
formally as part of an application form or informally during an interview,
that individuals submit to genetic testing.
A complete right to decision-making privacy would fully shield the
individual from those external agents seeking to influence the medical
decision-making process for their own benefit. Some commentators have
argued that while individuals are entitled to complete decision-making
privacy with employers, they are not so entitled with insurance companies
since a genetic disorder is a valid consideration when determining
appropriate insurance premiums." In jurisdictions such as Canada, where
the health care system is publicly funded, this issue is largely avoided since
30 See RJ. Pokorski, "Genetic Information and Life Insurance" (1995) 376 Nature 13; S.E
Zimmerman, "The Use of GeneticTests and GeneticInformation yLife Insurance Companie. Da.5
This Differ from the Use of Routine Medical Information?" (1993) 2 Genetic Testing 3 at 6:
Some consumers, politicians, and geneticists feel that because most genetic tests vill merely
indicate a predisposition for developing a disease or ilness that may not oreur at Eome future
time, insurers should be prohibited from using such information in the deceaon.making pro=e:e.
This reflects a misunderstanding of the riskselection process and the bazic premis of insurance.
The process of undemwiting is based upon the existence of uncertainty. In fact, if there were no
uncertainty as to the outcome, then we would not be talking about insurance at all, since by
definition, insurance is protection against an uncertain event.
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all individuals are theoretically granted unqualified access to
comprehensive medical care. In jurisdictions such as the United States,
where the health care system is privately funded, a statutory right to
decision-making privacy could be used to prevent insurance companies
from excluding genetically predisposed yet asymptomatic individuals from
insurance benefits.3' This would ensure that the current practice of cross-
subsidization would survive and that insurance would be affordable by all.
The right to secrecy or information privacy would ensure an
individual's right to privacy after he or she has resolved to undergo genetic
testing by allowing the individual to keep the results private.32 By explicitly
making it unlawful for employers or insurance companies to either request
or require, whether formally or informally, the disclosure of health
information that is not directly related to workplace safety, a statutory right
to information privacy would cure the shortcomings of the right to privacy
existing in the general laws of the United States and Quebec and would
greatly enhance the almost nonexistent protection that is available in
common law Canada. Moreover, by linking secrecy violations to
progressively scaled monetary penalties, the statutory right to secrecy would
have significant deterrent value.
Both the right of decision-making privacy and the right to secrecy
need to be qualified. An exception to the rights of decision-making and
information privacy should be provided where workers are routinely
exposed to toxins, chemicals, or other potentially harmful agents. Given the
elevated risk of disease that is associated with placing someone who is
genetically vulnerable to a particular occupational illness in direct contact
with a workplace toxin that is known to induce that illness, employers
would be entitled to test potential employees for genetic predispositions for
occupational illnesses.33 In these cases, employers should remain subject to
the confidentiality requirements.
31
See C. Lee, "Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic Discrimination by the
Health Insurance Industry" (1993) 13 Pace L. Rev. 189. See also, "Critical Condition,"supra note 25.
32 See Whalen, supra note 29 at 599, where Justice Stevens notes the "individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters....1"
33 For a discussion of genetic susceptibility testing for occupational illnesses, see M.A. Rothstein,
"Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness" (1983) 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1379;
J. Richter, "Taking the Worker as You Find Him: The Quandary of Protecting the Rights as well as
the Health of the Worker with a Genetic Susceptibility to Occupational Disease" (1997) 8 Md. J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 189; and J. Seltzer, "The Cassandra Complex: An Employer's Dilemma in the
Genetic Workplace" (1998) 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 411.
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The third aspect of privacy-confidentiality-would govern the
secondary disclosure of personal information by those who become privy
to it. It would be the right to impose on others the obligation of keeping
secret personal information that they kmow about you. In the doctor-patient
relationship, the common law right to confidentiality prevents physicians
from disclosing information received from the patient to anyone not
directly involved in the patient's care and treatment. 4 This entitlement has
ancient roots, being an important element of the Hippocratic Oath s The
statutory right to confidentiality would go beyond its common law
counterpart. Chronologically, confidentiality would lie at the tail end of
privacy, arising only after the individual would have freely chosen to
undergo genetic testing, and have voluntarily conveyed the testing results
to a "trustee" of the information. It is upon these trustees, the persons
admitted into the inner circle of the individual's confidence, that the duty
of confidentiality would be imposed. The duty vould not be premised on
the existence of a doctor-patient relationship and would not therefore be
limited in application to primary care physicians. By attaching to the
information itself rather than to the therapeutic relationship in which
personal information is often revealed, the statutory duty would apply to
everyone that becomes privy to the confidential information. Absent the
free and informed consent of the individual to whom the information
pertains, trustees would be prohibited from disclosing the personal
information.36 More specifically, each new disclosure of confidential
information, whether full or partial, would require prior authorization. This
would enable individuals to choose whether or not they want to admit a
new trustee into their inner circle of confidence and, if so, the nature and
quantum of the specific information that is revealed to that new trustee.
34 GJ. Annas, The Rights ofPatients (Totowa, NJ.: Humana Precs, 1992) at 160-95
35 The modern version of the Hippocratic Oath reads: "Whatcver in connection v-ith my
professional practice or not in connection with it I may see or hear in the hles of my pent-, V.hich
ought not be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, reckoning that all such zhould be kept secret." See Twe
Hippocratic Oath, online: Tripod <httpllmembers.tripodeontnktiuro hip aca.htm> (date eeee'--d-
2 October 2001).
36Some scholars have begun to identify the elements of consent that %, ould need to be pre--nt
in order for it to be truly informed. See "Genetic Prixacy,"stspra note 19 at 327:
To render consent meaningful, the processmust incorporate clear content areas: howprivaciand
securitywillbe maintained; the person's right ofovincrfhlp of, and eontroloer, the data;s.exfic
instructions on means of access, re~ie%, and corrcction of records; the length of time that the
information will be stored and the circumstances %, hen it v ould be Q ipunscd; authornzcd third-
party access to the data; and future sceondary uses. If sccondary ucs of thoze data go bqond
the scope of the original consent additional consent must be sought.
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Compliance with the statutory duty of confidentiality would require that
genetic and health information be stored in anonymous form and that
electronic security tools be a standard feature of institutional record storage
systems.37 In addition, given that the telecommunications age has
practically erased jurisdictional boundaries, what is required are laws that
are uniform or at least consistent across jurisdictions.
A basic exception to a statutory right to confidentiality would exist
in the case of disclosures of personal information that occur between health
care professionals and are necessary for the patient's care. Yet, in even
these cases, the primary care provider to whom the personal information
is first revealed should not pass on more information than is reasonably
required to perform the task at hand. The exact quantum of information
that is disclosed between health care providers is a matter of professional
discretion, but should be analyzed by means of an objective test should the
issue be litigated. Moreover, other exceptions to the statutory right to
confidentiality would be necessary in order to promote other important yet
competing interests. Further consideration is required on how to balance
the right to privacy with other competing interests, such as the
advancement of medical research and improved public health surveillance.
A major factor that will need to be taken into consideration is whether the
information is linked to a personal identifier, in which case prior
authorization should be required, or whether the information is being
transmitted in an unlinked format. In this case, prior authorization would
seem less vital given that the risk of privacy intrusion is greatly mitigated.
Violations of any of these aspects of privacy could be associated with
progressively scaled monetary penalties, which would ensure the right to
privacy by establishing significant disincentives.
V. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEGAL
FRAMEWORK IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
The available privacy protections in both the United States and
Canada are fragmented and inconsistent, and include major gaps in
coverage. Neither jurisdiction has comprehensive national laws regulating
how private genetic and health information are protected, secured, or
verified. This section will identify the laws intended to safeguard the right
to privacy in the context of genetic and health information in the United
3 7 L.O. Gostin, "Health Information Privacy" (1995)80 Cornell L. Rev, 451 [hereinafter "Health
Information Privacy"].
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States and Canada, and then analyze and criticize their effectiveness in light
of the framework for protecting genetic and health information privacy we
have proposed.
A. Common and Equitable Laws
The common and equitable lavs of the United States, ommon law
Canada, and Quebec offer inadequate protection for the choice, secrecy,
and confidentiality elements of the right to privacy.
1. Choice
Medical decision-making privacy, or privacy of choice, is protected on
the basis of autonomy."' This is the same philosophical foundation upon
which the requirements of informed consent are premised. The doctrine
of informed consent requires that prior to the performance of a medical
procedure a patient's physician must accurately describe and characterize
the proposed treatment and disclose any risks associated with the treatment
that the patient would reasonably deem significant.4 Only then can a
patient consent to a medical procedure of his or her ownm freewill. Thus, the
doctrine of informed consent ensures that it is ultimately the patient and no
one else who decides whether to accept or reject treatment, no matter how
foolish the decision may appear to be.4! ' While medical decision-making
38 For early sources making reference to this right, -ee Union Pacific Radrad v. Balsford, 141
U.S. 250 at 251 (1S91), Cray J. (rNo right is held more sacred, or ts more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the rosstf:sion and control of hLs o;xn -.rson, free
from the restraint or interference of others, unless byclear and unquestionable authont of las."4'and
Schloendoif.fv. SocietVofNew York Hospital,211 N.Y. 125 ( 1914)., cr Ju.tce Cardozo .E er human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine vhat shall be done wath hts ow-,n b '."
See generally T.L Beauchamp, "Informed Consent" in RM. Veatch, cd., Mcdical Edtrs (Bi:ton,-
Jones & Bartlett, 19S9) at 173.
39 In Canada, see E.I. Picard & G.B. Robertson, L¢.al Libdhu of Dtaors and fc.kp::1ts in
Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carmvell, 1996). In the United Statcs. Ece R.R. Faden & T L
Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informzed Consent (New York: O'%rd Uni. ersity Prcae, l 961;
and Biomedical Ethics, supra note 7.
40 In Canada, see Hopp v. Lepp, [190 2 S.C.R, 192; Rct! v. Hujzes. [19 91 2 SC.R, 0-9, In
Quebec, see also Civil Code, supra note 2. art. 10, 11. In the United States, sce Saf ov. Lelni Stanford
Jr. Universit, Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560 (1957); and Cantcrt:u ,ny vSnce, 464 F2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
4) In common law Canada, see Fleming v. Reid (1991). 4 O.R. (3d) 74 (CA,) ("The fact that
serious risks or consequences may result from a refusal of mcdical treatment deps not vitate the nght
of medical self-determination. The doctrine of informed consent ensures the freedom of indivaduals
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autonomy would require employers and insurance companies to seek
consent before subjecting an individual to genetic testing, it would not stop
them from making such testing a precondition to procuring or maintaining
employment or insurance. Thus, unlike the statutory right to decision-
making privacy that is being proposed in this article, the common law right
to autonomy does not adequately protect individuals from undue influence
in making personal medical decisions in the absence of subsequent adverse
social consequences such as the loss of employment or insurance benefits.
2. Secrecy
The right to secrecy is the right to prevent the unlawful collection
of personal information by third parties. This right is poorly protected by
the common law. In the United States, the common law right to privacy
might be used to prevent third parties from collecting personal information
about an individual.42 For instance, employers and insurers that attempt to
unlawfully collect genetic and health information through mandatory
disclosure policies might be liable for damages on the grounds that this
constitutes an intrusion into the seclusion of employees and policyholders.43
However, the common law right to privacy has not typically been applied
to the unlawful collection of genetic or health information. In common law
Canada, on the other hand, the right to secrecy receives even less
to make choices about their medical care. It is the patient, not the doctor, who ultimately must decide
if treatment-any treatment-is to be administered."); Malette v. Shulman (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321
(Ont. C.A.); Walker v. Region 2 Hospital Corp. (1994), 116 D.L.R. (4th) (N.B.C.A.). In Quebec, see
Nancy B. v. Hftel.Dieu de Quobec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Que. S.C.). In the United States, see
Crzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
42 The common law right to privacy has long been recognized in the United States. See, for
example: De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 (1881) [hereinafter De May] (holding that the common law
right to privacy grants to women the right to exclude strangers from the delivery room during
childbirth); Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, 122 Ga. 190 (1905) (holding that the common law
right to privacy protects against appropriations of name or likeness). But see Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box, 171 N.Y. 538 (1902) (rejecting the view that there is a general common law right to
privacy). In 1960, William Prosser reviewed American privacy jurisprudence and concluded that the
common law recognizes a right to privacy in at least four instances: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and, (4)
appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. See W.L Prosser,
"Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal. L Rev. 383 at 389.
43 See, for example, Berthiaumne's Estate v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976) (unauthorized use of
photograph of dying patient for documentation in medical record held to be intrusion into seclusion).
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protection than in the United States, since it is not yet clear whether a
common law right to privacy has been acknowledged by the courts.
In the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec, privacy is considered to be
a "personality right"-a concept that is foreign to common lawjurisdictions
where invasion of privacy is categorized as falling within the realm of tort
law-and is expressly enumerated in itsjus coninune45 This right to privacy
offers greater privacy protection than that which is available in either the
United States or common law Canada. In addition to granting to
individuals a private law right of action against those who make an
unauthorized use of their name, image, likeness, and so forth," the Quebec
right to privacy makes it illegal for anyone to establish "a file on another
person" unless there exists a "serious and legitimate" reason for doing so!'
Moreover, only information that is "relevant" to the stated objective of the
file may be collected4
Employers have serious and legitimate reasons for establishing and
maintaining files on current and prospective employees. For instance,
information needs to be collected so that employers can weigh the
qualifications ofjob candidates and assess the work performance ofexisting
employees. Since employers are required by law to provide their employees
with a safe working environment, they also have a legitimate interest in
collecting genetic and health information regarding predispositions to
workplace illnesses. Conversely, the collection of genetic and health
44 See Dyne Hold ings v. Royal nsurance Co. ofCanada (1996). 133 NilU & P.EI.R., (PEICA.)
at 334 ("The courts in Canada are not far from recognizing a common lawv right of privacylf they have
not already done so"). Compare Copeland v. Adamnson, 11972 3 0R. 243 (H C.) (denying the
existence of a common law right topri acy) toSaccone v. Off (1931),34 O.R. t2d 317 (CO LCt,);Lp:ce
v. Borsa (1996), 17 O.T.C. 64 (Gen. Div.) (acknowedging the eistence of common law right to
privacy). See generally, A.M. Linden, Canadian Toi La,'. 6th ed. (Toronto; Buttenvorth:, 1997) at
55-59;J.D.R. Craig,Invasionof Privacyand Charter Values:The C'ommon.lav.,TortA%, acn"( 1997)
42 McGill I.A. 355. In response to this legal hiatus, many common law proinccs hay enacted
legislation makingthe invasion of privacy astatutory tort, Sce, for example:plnacyAct, R.SBoC, 196,
c. 373; PfriacyAct, R.S.M. 1937, c. P-125; and PtiiatvAct, R S.N. 1990, c. P-21
45 See Civil Code, supra note 2, arts. 3, 35.
46 See ibid., arts. 35, 36. Six particular acts are identified by the Cad Cole as constituting an
invasion of privac. (1) enteringor taking anv thing in a person'sdelling;(2) intentionally intercepting
or using a person's private communications; (3) appropriating or usinga par.on'5 image or %a cVide
he or she is in private premises; (4) keeping a persons prinate life under ob.crvation by any means
(5) usinga person's name, image, likeness, or voice for a purpose other than the legitimate information
of the public;, and, (6) using a person's correspondence. manuscripts, or other parcanal documents.
See ibid., art- 36.
47 ibid, art. 37.
4S Ibid.
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information for purposes that are unrelated to workplace health and safety
would constitute an unlawful invasion of privacy. Where employers require
the disclosure of irrelevant genetic or health information as a precondition
to attaining or retaining employment, there is a clear infringement on the
right to privacy. 49 However, what happens when employers merely request
irrelevant health information? While the Quebec legislation seems to offer
a comprehensive solution to the problem, there are some ambiguities with
the prohibition that could be exploited by employers and insurance
companies. For instance, where an individual is denied employment
following his or her refusal to acquiesce to the employer's request for
irrelevant genetic or health information, there is an infringement of the
right to privacy but not necessarily an unlawful act according to the Quebec
legislation. If indeed compliance with a request for irrelevant genetic and
health information constitutes a waiver, then the individual would not be
entitled to any reparations under the right to privacy provisions.
At the same time, an individual who is discharged or fails to obtain
employment after having disclosed irrelevant health information pursuant
to either a mandatory or discretionary disclosure policy instituted by the
employer could elect to sue the employer on the ground of discrimination.
However, proof of causation would be an impediment to recovery since the
individual has the burden of proof and would have to establish that the
rejection was based on illegitimate considerations. By explicitly making it
unlawful for employers to either request or require, whether formally or
informally, the disclosure of health data that is not directly related to
workplace safety, a statutory right to information privacy would cure the
shortcomings of the right to privacy existing in the general laws of the
United States and Quebec, and would greatly enhance the almost
nonexistent protection that is available in common law Canada. Moreover,
by linking privacy violations to progressively scaled monetary penalties, the
statutory right to privacy would have significant deterrent value.
49 See Syndical des Employees v. Caisse Populaire St-Stanislas de Montral, [19991 R.J.D.T. 350
(holding that while employers can require of their workers that they provide a medical certificate
should they need to miss work on the basis of illness, they cannot mandate that the precise nature of
the illness be disclosed in the certificate since this would constitute a violation of the right to privacy).
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3. Confidentiality
Both American and Canadian courts have used common law
sources, such as contract, civil liability, and fiduciary law to protect and
preserve the confidentiality of health information. These sources protect
the privacy of information that is disclosed during the doctor-patient
encounter by placing the obligations of trust and loyalty on primary care
physicians who are entrusted to maintain the confidentiality of the personal
information. The general rule is that health care professionals may disclose
medical information only if the patient has expressly or impliedly consented
to the disclosure or if the law requires or permits disclosure5 ' Physicians
who breach their duty of confidentiality by making an unauthorized
disclosure could be pursued on a number of legal grounds. First, given that
the doctor-patient relationship is recognized in law as having a contractual
basis,51 the unauthorized disclosure of medical information by health care
professionals could give rise to an action for breach of contract0 Second,
patients could also elect to sue in civil liability should the disclosure result
in foreseeable injury.5 3 Third, given the fiduciary nature of the doctor-
patient relationship, patients could also sue on equitable grounds. As
fiduciaries, health care professionals have the obligation to hold
information received from or about the patient in confidence. Breach of
50 See, for example,Hayv Universityof.4bena Hospital (1990), 69 D.LR. (4th) 755 (Alb, Q B.)
at 757-5S:
The physician-patient relationship is clothed with confidentiality, a rightvhich mayba w ed by
the patient. Confidentiality is an important attribute of the pkzician.pattent rclationmhip,
essential in promoting open communication between physician and patient. The patient may
expressywaihe this right or, by his actions, be found to have imphcdlyvaived it. Altematwely.
an overridingpublicinterest or astatutorydirection mayjustifya ph :ici n dielozinginformation
about the patient. In the absence of such circumstancez, the right remains and aphy-eianwvho
divulges confidential information could face an action for breach of confidentiality.
5 1 See, for example, Everard v. Hopkins (1615), 0 E R. 1164 (MB.1; and Stater v. B cr (1767),
95 E.R. 860. See more recently Central & Eastern Trust v-r Pafise, [19Zb6 2 S C.R. 147.
52 See A.B. v.CD. (1851), 14 Dunlop's S.C. 177 (Ct. Se., ScoL). For a recent American caze,
see Hamonds v. Aetna Casualty& Sureo, 243 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Fora recent Canadian
case, see Peters-Brown v. Regina District Health Board, [1996 1 W.WR., 337 (SzrL QB.).
53 See Fumiss v. Fiett, 1195S] N.Z.LR.396 (S.Cl. In the United States, see HtwpThc1v Fast
Interstate Bankof Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1935) (en bane). See generally A B. Vtcre;' Breazh of
Confidence: An Emerging Tort" (19S2) S2 Columbia L Rev. 1426.
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that confidence is actionable and could give rise to an equitable remedy. 54
Fourth, the right to privacy that is available in the United States" and in
Quebec56 could be used to pursue a physician who unlawfully publishes
genetic or health information regarding a patient in identifiable form, for
instance in a medical journal or newspaper. Fifth, the obligation of
confidentiality can additionally be found in the codes of ethics,57 and more
recently in the health information privacy codes, 8 that are promulgated by
professional medical associations. Health care providers that breach the
confidentiality requirement of these codes could face disciplinary
proceedings and be subject to penalties, such as the suspension or removal
of licensure.
The physician's duty of confidentiality is not absolute. Occasionally,
the law imposes on the physician the duty to warn ascertainable third
parties who may be at risk. In these cases, the physician is permitted to
54 1 n Canada, see Mclnerney v. MacDonald (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 415 (S.C.C.); and Norberg v.
Wynrib, [19921 2 S.C.R. 226. In the United States, see Ritter v. Rush.Presbyterian.St.-Luke's Medical
Center, 532 N.E. 2d 327 (111. 1988); and Alexander v. Kidght, 177 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1962).
55 See De May, supra note 42. Warren & Brandeis were referring to this aspect of privacy when
they said that "[tlhe design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the
community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity
and to protect all persons, whatsoever their person or station, from having matters which they may
properly prefer to keep private, made public against theirwill." See "The Right to Privacy,"supra note
I at 214-15.
5 6 See Civil Code,supra 2, art. 37 (holding that no person may, "without the consent of the person
concerned or authorization by law, communicate such information to third persons or use it for
purposes that are inconsistent with the purposes for which the file was established."),
In Canada, see Canadian Medical Association, Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical
Association (1996), s. 22, online: Canadian Medical Association <http://www.cma.ca/
inside/policybase/i 996/10-15.htm> (date accessed: 24 September 2001) ("Respect the patient's right
to confidentiality except when this right conflicts with your responsibility to the law, or when the
maintenance of confidentiality would result in a significant risk of substantial harm to others or to the
patient if the patient is incompetent"). In the United States, see American Medical Association, Code
ofMedical Ethics, online: American Medical Association <http:llwwwama.assn.orglapps/pfonline/
pfonlinefn=browse&doc=policyfiles/CEJA/E-5.05.HTM&&s.t=&stp=&nth= I &prev.pol=
policyfiles/CF.JA/E-4.07.HTM&nxt~pol=policyfiles/CEJA/E-5.0l.HTM&> (date accessed: 1 October
2001) ("The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the
express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law.").
58 CMA, supra note 28, ss. 1.30), 2.1 (d). The "duty of confidentiality" is defined in the code as
"the duty of physicians and other health professionals in a fiduciary relationship with patients to ensure
that health information is kept secret and not disclosed or made accessible to others unless authorized
by patient consent." See CMA, ibid., c. B.
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disclose the relevant information and Will not be held liable to the
individual for breach of medical confidentiality.59
The common law does not adequately protect an individual's right
of confidence. First of all, these safeguards apply only to information that
is revealed to primary care physicians, notwithstanding that many persons
have access to a patient's genetic and health information.P In addition, it
is unclear whether the duty of confidence is imposed on physicians who
work for employers and insurance companies and who examine or test
persons on behalf of these entities.61 But most significantly, by attaching
protection to the doctor-patient relationship rather than to the information
59 For instance, where a patient informs his or her phyzician that they intend to harm an
identifiable third party, the physician is required to breach the duty of confidence. Should the third
party suffer injury as a result of the physician's failure to discharge his or her duty to %, arn. the law,
could impose civil liability upon that physician. In Canada, see Smith vJones. [199] I SCR. 455. In
the United States, see Tarasoff v. Regents ofthe Univcrsi-o'fCah comia. 551 P 2d 334 (Cal. 1976); and
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D.C Neb. 19SO), Another instance m vheh
physicians may ha-.e a duty to warn is ,vhen they know that their patient is prcdispozed to dveopmng
a genetic illness that is likely to run in the patient's famiy. \While it is not .et clear in lax.%,hcther the
duty to warn will trump the duty of confidentiality in these cases, v.hat decs eem to be reaxonably
clear is that physicians would be unwise to breach their patient's confidence unless the particular
genetic illness at issue is both serious and preventable. See W.F. Flanagan,"Genetic Data and Medicatl
Confidentiality" (1995) 3 Health LJ. 269 at 237 ("unless the information rrtains to asEenousgenetie
disorder that is unlikely to be detected by other means, and can be used to seek some helpful
treatment, or avoid harmful environmental stimuli. aphysician isill-adviscd todr4oze tht-sinformation
without patient consent, as the physician's breach of confidentiality may not be excuscd by a court of
law"). At least one American court has already addressed this issue. See Safer. Pac:, 677 A.2d 1183
(1996).
60J.G. Hodge, Jr., "National Health Information Prv acy and New Federalism" (ZB) 14 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Poly 791 at 79S-99:
While it [i.e., confidentiality] protects health data as part of the physician.patient relatiomhlip,
modern data collection is based only in small part on this relationship. Health record-- mere e r,
contain a substantial amount of information gathered from numerous primary and secondary
,
sources: laboratories, pharmacies, schools, public health officials, researchers, insurers, and other
indiiduals and institutions. Patient health records are not merely hept in the office of pnsate
physicians or health plans, but also by goxernmcnt agencies regtonal health database
organizations, and information brokers. Databases maintained in each of these setting are
collected and transmitted electronically, reconfigured, and linked. The duty of confidentiality
which arises at the point of clinical care simply does not etend to all these parties for all these
purposes. Focusing legal protection of health information prn'acy on the therar.eutte
relationships between physicians and patients%, thin a national health information infratructure
is thus highly inadequate.
61 See generally D.M. Studdert, "Direct Contracts, Data Sharing and Employee Risk Selecton.
New Stakes for Patient Privacy inTomorrow's Health Insurance Marketfs (199 Z5 Am J. L & Med.
233.
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itself, the confidentiality safeguards do not extend to those individuals or
organizations that obtain personal information from primary care givers.62
This may be less of a problem in Quebec given that confidentiality is
protected pursuant to the right to privacy which itself applies to "[e]very
person who establishes a file on another person." 63 Once the primary care
physician has made an authorized or unauthorized disclosure, the common
and equitable law no longer provides a remedy against further disclosures
of the information.
B. Constitutional Law
Neither the American Constitution nor the Canadian Constitution
expressly affirms a right to privacy. 4 Nevertheless, the supreme courts of
both jurisdictions have found privacy to be deserving of a certain degree of
constitutional protection and have proceeded to discover or read in privacy
safeguards.65 At the same time, these safeguards are not absolute and must
be balanced against various other interests.66 A number of American states
have amended their constitutions so as to afford additional privacy
protection.67 Although Canadian provinces do not possess their own
constitutions, Quebec has enacted the Charter of Human Rights and
62 See "Genetic Privacy," supra note 19 at 326.
63 See Civil Code, supra note 2, art. 37.
64 In Canada, see Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I [hereinafter Canadian Charter]. In the
United states, see the Amendments to the United States Constitution [hereinafter U.S. Const.
amend.].
65 In Canada, see, for example, Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Southam];
and R. v. BigMDrug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. In the United States, see, for example, Pierce v. Society
of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Palko v. State of Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937); Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and, Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
66 In Canada, see, for example: R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 45 [hereinafter Duartel per
Justice La Forest: "[ilt thus becomes necessary to strike a reasonable balance between the right of
individuals to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its
responsibilities for law enforcement." In the United States, see Yin v. State of California, 95 F.3d 864,
873 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997). See also: Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
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Freedoms that explicitly acknowledges the right to privacy! This provincial
legislation is a quasi-constitutional document since Quebec laws that are
inconsistent with the Quebec Charter's provisions may be overturned.
In both the United States and Canada, the constitutional right to
privacy is primarily protected by the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.69 This right has been used to uphold an accused's
right to decision-making privacy and information privacy,7 However, the
eistence and extent of a constitutional right to privacy independent and
more fundamental than the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures remains a matter of conjecture. The Supreme Court of Canada has
ex~pressed sympathy for the proposition that section 7 of the Canadian
Charter includes a right to privacy.," In the United States, "zones of privacy
protection" have been found to be located within the first and third
amendments, the liberty interest of the fourteenth amendment, the fifth
amendment's right against self-incrimination, the ninth amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, as well as within the "penumbra" of the
Bill of Rights. 72
1. Choice
A constitutional right to decision-making privacy would arguably
safeguard the right of individuals to be unencumbered by the state when
consideringwhether to undergo any form of medical or bodily intervention,
whether it be conventional health care treatment, an abortion, genetic
testing, the termination of life-sustaining treatment, or euthanasia. In
Canada, medical decision making has been grounded in the rights to liberty
and security of the person, and has been justified on the basis of respect for
63 R.S.Q. 195, c. C-12, s. 5 (stating that "ev'.em rerzon has a right to the respzct of his prr4ate
life.").
69 In Canada, see Canadian Chartersupra note 64,s.S. Se Southan,supra note 65 at 169 (v',hcre
the court stated that the purpose of section 3 of the Canadtan Chattcr"is... to protect Indi'aduat; from
unjustified state intrusions upon their pri acy'). In the United States, ce U S, Const, amend IV.
70 In Canada, see, for example, R9 v. Stiman, [19971 1 SCR. 697.
71 See, for example, . v. Mils, 11986] 1 S1CR. S63 at 919-20 jhcreinafter Mlis]; I. VHare
1198S) 2 S.C.R. 3S7 at 412; R %. Morgentalcr, [19031 1 SCoR 30 at 55 [hereinafter Me'reacri; and
. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at 4,2 [hereinafter O'Cenncr.
7 See, for example, Roe %, l5;ade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) [hereinafter Raoz; Stanley'.
Geoigia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); Katz v. Unitcd States, 3S9 U S, 347 (1967); and Gns.-.a!J v.
Connecticut, 331 U.S. 479 (1965) [hereinafter Gns:.;.eJ See generally L Tribe, 4mcntian
Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 142S,) at 139 3-12
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autonomy and self-determination.73 Given that decision-making privacy is
a necessary precondition to autonomy, it too must be protected pursuant
to section 7 of the Canadian Charter. For a decision to be truly
autonomous, the decision maker must be free from external coercion and
oppression, which would otherwise threaten the voluntariness of the
decision. The right to decision-making privacy safeguards the sanctity of
autonomous action by shielding the individual from those, including the
state, who would use their power to unduly influence the decision-making
process. While the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly
recognized the existence of a right to decision-making privacy under section
7 of the Canadian Charter, it has used liberty and security of the person as
a means of preventing the loss of privacy that can result from government
infringements upon personal autonomy 4 and state imposed psychological
trauma.7' In the United States, the existence of a constitutional right to
privacy has been acknowledged and has been used to protect the integrity
of personal decisions, such as whether to use contraceptives76 or have an
abortion.77
2. Secrecy
73 See R. v. Rodriguez, [19931 3 S.C.R. 519 at 588 per Justice Sopinka, writing for the
majority:"[tlhere is no question, then, that personal autonomy, at least with respect to the right to
make choices concerning one's own body, control over one's physical and psychological integrity, and
basic human dignity are encompassed within security of the person, at least to the extent of freedom
from criminal prohibitions which interfere with these." This finding was echoed by the minority in
Rodriguez when Justice McLachlin, as she was then, noted that "[s]ecurity of the person has an element
of personal autonomy, protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals with respect to decisions
concerning their own body. It is part of the persona and dignity of the human being that he or she have
the autonomy to decide what is best for his or her body." See ibid., at 618. See also, Motgentaler, supira
note 71 at 171 where Justice Wilson stated that "I would conclude, therefore, that the right to liberty
contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important
decisions intimately affecting their private lives."
74 Ibit
75 See Mills, supra note 71 at 920, per Justice Lamer, who held that security of the person protects
against state imposed psychological trauma that can take the form of "stigmatization of the accused,
loss ofprivacy, stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption
of family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to outcome and sanction." [emphasis added].
76 See, for example, Griswold, supra note 72 (striking down statutory prohibitions on the use of
contraceptives by married couples); and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down
statutory prohibitions on the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples).
7 7 See, for example, Roe, supra note 72 at 153. Confirmed in City ofAkron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); and Thornbuigh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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2. Secrecy
A constitutional right to information privacy is slowly being
developed in both Canada and the United States. The Supreme Court of
Canada has recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of personal
information in third-party records, such as medical or psychotherapy
records, against their compelled production during legal proceedings. The
Court has also mentioned that it intends to safeguard a "biographical core
of personal information" '79 by granting to the individual control over the
dissemination of this information at the point of disclosure. Medical
information, including genetic data, would certainly be counted within the
biographical core. The right to information privacy, for instance, prohibits
the state from appropriating serum or tissue samples that are stored at
medical facilities-and that were collected from individuals for medical
purposes-in order to extract genetic or other health data from them. t
Since the constitutional right to information privacy has typically been
considered in cases dealing with criminal proceedings, the extent to which
this right restricts the government from gathering personal information
regarding its citizens in other instances, such as for public health reasons,
is not yet clear. In the United States, the constitutional right to privacy does
not prevent the collection, storage, and dissemination of health information
in government data banks so long as the state has implemented adequate
78 See O'Connor, supra note 71 at 434, per Justice Sopinka- "a constitutional right to pasacy
extends to information contained in many forms of third party records." See ato-, lbad at 47, p-r
Justice L'Heurex-Dub6: "s. 7 requires a reasonable systcm of 'pre-authorzation" to justify court-
sanctioned intrusions into the prixate records ofv.itnesses in legal procedings "See aLoR. v, OJv n,
[19931 4 S.C.R. 595.
79 See R v. Plant, [199313 S.C.R. 281 at 293:
IT]he Carter should seek to protect a biographical core of r-r:onal information %,,huch
individuals in a free and democratic society v.ould 'sish to maintain and control from
dissemination to the state. Thiswould include information %, hich tends to re eal intimate dutaiL
of the lifestyle and personal choices of the indi idual.
so See Duarte,supra note 66 at 46, per Justice La Forest,.here the right to information proacy
is defined as"the right of the individual to determine for himelf\:hen, how, and tov.hat etent he vill
release personal information about himself." See also O'Cenner supra note 71 at 4Z&-87, per Ju:ttce
L'Heurewx-Dub6: "The essence of prihacy. howe r, is that once maded, it can eldom be reained
For this reason, it is all the more important for reasonable eerzctattons cf pnriac to be protected at
the point of disclosure:'
81 SeeR. v. Dynent, [1983) 2 S.C.R. 417 at 428, per Justice La Forest. "[t~he use of a _-an's
body without his consent to obtain information about him, imades an area of pn~acy esc-ntial to the
maintenance of his human dignity." See also R. v.Pelzortsmv, [1937 1 SC R. 945. and,R. . ch,
[1993J 3 S.C.R. 76S.
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standards and procedures for protecting the privacy of the information.82
Provided that the state articulates a legitimate societal purpose and
employs reasonable security measures, American courts have not interfered
with the traditional governmental activities of information collection.83
Nevertheless, when the government is acting in the capacity of an employer
and has in its possession the tissues and cells of current and prospective
employees, the right to privacy will protect against the genetic testing of
these tissues and cells by the government for purposes going beyond those
which were originally consented to.84
The protection afforded by any decision-making or information
privacy rights within the Canadian and American constitutions apply only
to transgressions perpetrated by the state, and do not apply to private
sector relationships,85 such as those existing between individuals and
medical professionals, employers, and insurers. As a result, constitutional
law is at best an incomplete instrument for disciplining the collection
practices of a health system which, particularly in the United States, is
largely privately run.
82 See Whalen, supra note 29 at 605, per Justice Stevens, where the court acknowledged "the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
data banks or other massive government files," but nevertheless held that the supervision of public
health and other important government activities "require the orderly preservation of great quantities
of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed."
83 See, for example,Nixon v.Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States
v. Westinghouse Electric, 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); and Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d
Cir. 1983).
84 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Norman-Bloodsaw]. In this case, a government employer made general health
examinations a precondition to obtaining employment. Having collected blood and urine samples from
job applicants, the employer then proceeded to conduct unauthorized analyses of the samples for
syphilis, the sickle cell trait, and pregnancy. The court upheld the right to decision-making privacy on
the basis of the fourth amendment, but noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments was also implicated: "the most basic violation possible involves the performance of
unauthorized tests-that is, the non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed medical information
that may be unknown even to plaintiffs. These tests may also be viewed as searches in violation of
Fourth Amendment rights that require Fourth Amendment scrutiny." See ibid. at 1269. The court also
differentiated between consent that is provided for a general medical examination and consent that
is necessary for the performance of more intrusive medical analyses: "[tlhat one has consented to a
general medical examination does not abolish one's privacy right not to be tested for intimate, personal
matters involving one's health-nor does consenting to giving blood or urine samples, or filling out a
questionnaire." See ibid. at 1270.
8 5 In Canada, see R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. In the United States, see
Whalen, supra note 29.
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Finally, the question of confidentiality., or the right of individuals to
impose on the state the obligation of keeping confidential the information
it collects about them, has only been indirectly addressed, such as through
the requirement that governments implement reasonable information
security safeguards. Because governments are the foremost collectors of
personal information, it is important that the confidentiality of the
information that they collect is diligently preserved. A flow of personal
information from government data banks to the private market, or to any
unauthorized user, would greatly undermine the legitimacy of the state as
an accumulator of information, thereby impairing the valid purposes for
which the data was originally collected.
C. Federal Legislation
Both the United States and Canada have passed general privacy
laws that govern the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information
by federal institutions.!6 Unfortunately, they apply only to the actions of the
federal government. Recently, however, the need for legislation that
protects the right to privacy has been acknowledged and governments in
both jurisdictions have started to take action. The Canadian Parliament
recently enacted the Personal Infonmation Protection and Electronic
DocumentsAct (PIPEDA),6Which governs the collection, use, and disclosure
of personal information by private organizations. Despite numerous
attempts,"' the United States Congress has not yet succeeded in enacting
private sector health information privacy laws.P Yet a certain degree of
86 In Canada, seePrivacyAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. In the United Statece Pnraq.4ctef 1974,
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1), 552(b)(2), 552(b)(3), 552(b)(b) (1996), online: WL (USCA).
87 Personal Infomation Protection and Elcctrenic Dojumants.act, SC. 2619, c, S [herinafter
PIPEDA).
lI See, for example: Genetic Employment Protcon Act of 1997 (HR, 2275), onlin: Library of
Congress <http//thomas.loc.gov> (date accessed: 3 August 20 01); Genctc Nondiscrnruation in the
Workplace Act of 1997 (H.R. 2215), online: Library of Congress <http;tIthomaelo .gov> (date
accessed: 3 August 2001); the Genetic Ptracv and Nndiscnnination Act of 1997, onne: Lbrary of
Congress <http:tlthomas.locgov> (date accessed: S August 2QDI); and, more recently, the Gcnetic
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Emp'.inzcnt Ict of 1999 (H R 2457), online: Library of
Congress <http:J/thomasJ.ocgov> (date accessed: S August 201).
$9 Nevertheless, the Department of Health and Human Services (lts) .ry recently enacted
privacy regulations to safeguard the privacyof indiidually idLentifiable health information. See45CFR
§ 160-164, online: WL (CFR). These regulations most hKely apply to genetic information. Sce the
definition of "health information" at 45 C.F.R. § 160,103. online: WL (CFR), Those entities covered
by the regulations-that is, health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers %-.ho
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private sector privacy protection is nevertheless available through statutes
such as theAmericans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 90 the Civil Rights Act of
1964,9' and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). 9
2
1. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
The PIPEDA was expressly designed to govern the collection, use,
and dissemination of personal information, including health data, by
federally regulated organizations.93 The application of the Act with respect
to "personal health information," which would encompass genetic
information, 94 does not come into force until January 2002.95 The Act also
provides for a lag period of three years, after which time it purports to
apply to provincially regulated industries.9 The privacy protections that are
imparted by the PIPEDA are substantively similar to those that are made
available by the general law of Quebec. 97 Like the general law of Quebec,
the PIPEDA makes use of an objective test by restricting the purposes for
which personal information may be collected to those that a "reasonable
person" would consider "appropriate" under the circumstances. 8 This is
another way of saying that organizations must have a "serious" and
"legitimate" reason for gathering each piece of information that they
request. The PIPEDA also provides that the gathering purposes must be
identified by the organization "at or before the time the information is
transmit any health information in electronic form, see Code of Federal Regulations, Public Welfare,
Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 160.102, online: WL (CFR)-are required to be in compliance with the
regulations by 14 April 2003. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.534, online: WL (CFR).
90 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101-12213 (1994), online: WL (USCA)
[hereinafter ADA].
91 Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1994).
9 2 Health Insurance Portability andAccountabilityAct, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)
(WEST 2000) [hereinafter HIPAA].
93 See PIPEDA, supra note 87, ss. 3, 4.
94 Ibid., s. 2 (defining personal health information as including "information derived from the
testing or examination of a body part or bodily substance of the individual").
9 5 1bid., ss. 30(1.1), 30(2.1).
96Ibid., ss. 30 (1), 30(2).
97 See supra notes 94, 95, and accompanying text.
98 See PIPEDA, supra note 87, ss. 3, 5(3).
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collected," 99 and that the gathering must be limited "to that which is
necessary for the purposes identified by the organization."'10
The PIPEDA also protects privacy by requiring that organizations
obtain the informed consent of individuals prior to the collection and
subsequent disclosure of personal information.19' For the consent to be
informed, organizations must disclose to individuals the intended purposes
for which the information is to be used or disclosed.lt° Unlike the common
and equitable laws discussed above, the PIPEDA does not provide for a
private right of action following an alleged breach of its provisions. Instead,
individuals who feel that their rights under the Act have been violated must
file a complaint With the Privacy Commissioner who Will investigate the
matter.1 )3 Although the PIPEDA is a step in the right direction, it
inadequately protects information privacy and fails to address the issue of
decisionmaking privacy.
2. The Americans With Disabilities Act
While the ADA was not designed to regulate the collection of
personal information by private organizations, it can nevertheless be used
to guard against the adverse consequences that may be associatedvith such
collection, namely discrimination. Title VII of the ADA prevents
discrimination on the basis of certain enumerated grounds including race,
religion, nationality, colour, and sex.'14 This title could be invoked in cases
where an individual possesses a genetic predisposition to an illness that is
exclusively or disproportionately found in people of a certain race, religion,
or other enumerated category. t 5 Title I of the ADA prevents discrimination
99 See Schedule I of PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4.2,
100 BM, s. 4.4.
101 IBU, s 4.3.1.
Ibi., ss. 4.2.5.. 4.3.2.
103 See PIPEDA, supra note 87, s. 11.
104 See ADA, supra note 90, § 2000e-2(a).
105 For instance, differential treatment following secctive testing of African Amerians for the
sickle cell anemia trait, or of Ashkenazi Jews for the Tay-Sachs trait, v.ould constitute discriminatton
underTitle VII of the ADA. This fact scenario occurred in ,crran-Bkc1.awsupra note 84,vherc the
employer selectively tested its African-American applicants for the smcle cell trait and its women
applicants for pregnancy. While this practice was held to violate the Title VII of the Cidlhjtz,'4ct
of 1964, the court did not specifically address whether it might also constitute a violation of Title VII
of the ADA. All claims based on the ADA were dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on the ground. that the
employer had not taken anyjob-related action against the plaintiffs on the ba"siof the testingand that
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on the basis of disability.'0 6 Most relevant to the issue of genetic
discrimination is the fact that employers are prohibited under Title I from
discriminating on the basis of information acquired through "medical
examinations and inquiries."' 7 While this term is not expressly defined in
the ADA, commentators have agreed that it encompasses genetic testing
and inquiries.'0 8
A claimant alleging genetic discrimination would have the burden
of proving that he or she has a disability, was otherwise qualified for the
employment or benefit, and was excluded from the employment or benefit
on the basis of disability.) 9 The difficulty in proving causation-namely,
that the lost employment opportunity was based on an illegitimate
considerations, such as an immaterial disability, rather than on merit,
experience, or some other valid factor-is a major impediment to the
vindication of legal rights. Since the second element is a question of fact to
be decided on a case-by-case basis, the crucial question of law that needs
to be decided is in relation to the first element of the test-namely, whether
genetic predispositions to future illnesses can be considered to be
disabilities under the ADA. The ADA provides three different means of
proving disability: (1) existence of a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activity; (2) existence of a record
of physical or mental impairment; and, (3) being regarded as having a
physical or mental impairment." Of these three definitions, a genetic
predisposition is most likely to be accepted as a disability according to the
the ADA does not limit the scope of employment entrance examinations to matters that arc "job-
related and consistent with business necessity.": ibid. at 1273. As one commentator has noted, despite
the lack of any employment-related action on the basis of the testing, it is unclear why the court did
not find the practice to "violate the ADA's requirement that conditional post-offer medical tests must
be given to all potential employees." See P.S. Miller, "Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace"
(1998) 26 J.L. Med. & Ethics 189 at 192.
See ADA, supra note 90 at § 12112(a).
107 Ibid., § 12112(d)(1).
108 See, for example, M.B. Kaufmann, "Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview
of Existing Protections" (1999) 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 393 at 405 [hereinafter "Genetic Discrimination")
("while there is no precise meaning of a medical test it cannot seriously be argued that a genetic test
is not a medical test under the ADA.").
109 See ADA, supra note 90 at § 12112(a).
tto Ibid., § 12102(2).
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language in the third test."' The "being regarded as having a disability" test
would require the claimant to show that the denial of employment,
promotion, or any other benefit was based on the employer's perception
that the claimant's genetic predisposition constituted an impairment."12 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has opined that
discrimination on the basis of a genetic predisposition falls within the ambit
of the "being regarded as having a disability" test."3 Moreover, inasmuch
as individuals with asymptomatic Hix, have been found to be deserving of
protection under the ADA, then it is conceivable that asymptomatic
individuals who are predisposed to genetic illnesses are also deserving of
protection.
We agree with the commentators who are concerned that the ADA
is insufficiently protective against genetic discrimination.' 4 First, the ADA
only covers employers with fifteen or more employees.' 5 Second, the ADA
does not expressly stipulate that genetic predispositions are covered by the
Act. Third, while the ADA prohibits employers from requiring that
individuals undergo genetic testing during the "pre-offer" stage," 6 it does
III What is most limiting with the first and second definitions of disability is that ,while a genetic
predisposition may substantially limit a major life function in the future, they do not do so in the
present. Nor is there, by definition, a current record of s mptomatic impairment. Of course, as with
any other symptomatic disease, these definitions v-ould be available to individuals v;hoze genetic
predispositions has already become phenotypic.
112 See "Genetic Discrimination" stupra note 10S at 413:
Unlike the otherdisability categories, this section isbacd on the employer'sesrceptions, not the
existence of a true disability or even the individual's ov.n jerceptton of himelf or her.lf ca
disabled. Individuals vith asymptomatic genetic ditorders, therefore, %ould most Itkely be
covered by this section because employers would be discriminating based on the prezence of a
genetic anomaly, not on the employee's inability to pfform.
113 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commisszon, EOC C prliance Manual § 902.3(a)
(1995), online: WL (EEOCCM), stating that the ADA:
applies to individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information
relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. Covered entities that discriminate against
individuals on the basis of such genetic information are regarding the individuals as haxing
impairments that substantiallylimit a majorlife activity.Those individuals, therefore,are covered
by the third part of the definition of'disabihty'.
114See, for example, "Genetic Discrimination," supra note 103; I.A. Rothstein, "Genetic
Discrimination in Employment and the Americans vith Disabilities Act" (1992) 29 Hous. L Rev. 23;
and T.L Rachinsky, "Genetic Testing: Toward a Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace" (2000) 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Employment L 575.
115 See ADA, supra note 90 at § 12111(5)(A).
116 Ibk, § 12112(d)(2)(A).
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not prohibit employers from requiring individuals to undergo genetic
testing following a conditional offer of employment, whether or not the test
is job-related or consistent with business necessity."7
3. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Like the ADA, the HIPAA is more concerned with inappropriate uses
of personal information than with the initial collection of such information.
The HIPAA prohibits "group health insurers" from basing initial or
continued insurance eligibility on health status-related factors, including
genetic information." 8 Moreover, while the Act does permit group health
insurers from limiting or excluding benefits in the case of "preexisting
conditions,""' 9 it explicitly prohibits these insurers from treating genetic
predispositions as preexisting conditions in the absence of accompanying
illness.'20 Taken together, these provisions prevent group health insurers
from denying, cancelling, or refusing to renew health insurance on the basis
of unexpressed genetic predispositions. Consequently, individuals are
meant to be able to change jobs without the fear that their health insurance
coverage will be terminated in the process.t1'
Unfortunately, the HIPAA does not offer comprehensive protection.
First, the HIPAA does not explicitly prohibit genetic discrimination outside
the group health insurance context. Consequently, it does not provide
protection to those who are self-employed or to those whose jobs do not
provide health benefits. Second, because the HIPAA is concerned with
discrimination, which is an adverse consequence of information collection,
rather than with the regulation of the collection itself, proof of causation
117 Ibid., § 12112(d)(3).
118 See HIPAA, supra note 92 at § 300gg-1 (a)( 1 )(F). Genetic information is defined under I III'AA
as information "about genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that may derive from an
individual or a family member. This includes information regarding carrier status and information
derived from laboratory tests that identify mutations in specific genes or chromosomes, physical
medical examinations, family histories, and direct analysis of genes or chromosomes." See Rules and
Regulations for Group Health Plan Requirements, 29 C.F.R. 2590.701-2.
119 See HII'AA, ibid., § 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg(b)(1)(A) (defining the term "preexisting condition
exclusion" as "a limitation or exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that the
condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage, whethel or not any medical
advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received before such date.").
120 Ibid-, § 300gg(b)(I)(B).
121 See M.T. White, "Underlying Ambiguities in Genetic Privacy Legislation" (1999) 3:4 Genetic
Testing 341.
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is once again a significant hindrance to the vindication of rights. Both the
HIPAA and the ADA would have offered far greater protection had they
simply prevented insurers and employers from collecting irrelevant health
information in the first place. Finally, since the HIPAA applies solely to the
insurance industry, it does not provide protection against employment
discrimination beyond that which is afforded by the ADA.
D. State/Provincial Legislation
1. Canada
Although most, if not all, Canadian provinces have enacted
legislation to safeguard the privacy of personal information held by public
bodies, 12 2 the actual protection afforded by these statutes is circumscribed
by a number of factors. Many of the statutes are ineffective because their
application is restricted to the public sector, the prohibitions are subjected
to awide array of exceptions, and the language is overtly general or makes
no specific reference to genetic health information.
At least two Canadian provinces, Quebec and Manitoba, have
nevertheless enacted legislation that is designed to govern the collection of
personal information in the private sector,23 and similar legislation has
been proposed in other provinces.'24 The Quebec legislation provides
specific rules vith respect to the collection, use, and dissemination of
personal information and is meant to complement the right to privacy that
is made available by the general law of Quebec.'? Two advantages of this
legislation over the general law are that the legislation expressly makes it
unlawful for employers to refuse to hire applicants w.ho refuse to disclose
irrelevant personal information,26 and that the legislation associates the
breach of its provisions with elevated penalties and therefore has significant
122 See, for example, Freedom of ilfonnation and Pretcction of Pat a y.4ct. RS.O. 19D, c. F31;
Freedom of Information and Protection of Pdfvac .Act, R SB.C 1996, c, 165; Frecedomn ef Infu=zr7tan
and Protection of PriracyAct, S.A. 1994, c. F-IS.i; andn'lct Reapctt.1fcess to Devumcnts Hc &UdBy
Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal hifornzauton, R.S Q. 1993, C. A-23l.
123 SeeAn Act Respectingtie Protection of Persenal ifeimiation in the Pat ateSector, R , Q, 1993,
c. P-39.1 [hereinafter Personal Infomation in te Pn ate Sctr; and Pcrezw!Hcazlth InfemzattonAct.
S.M. 1997, c. 51 [hereinafter Health Iformaton. Ict)
124 See, for example, G. Sharpe, "Regulating Health Information, The Ontario Approach"
(2000) 20 Health L. Can.69.
125 Personal Infomzation in tie Pdirate Sector, supra note 11-, s. I.
126 Ibid., ss. 4,5,9.
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deterrent value. 27 The Quebec legislation is nevertheless beset by the same
shortcomings as those that we discussed above in relation to the general law
of Quebec."
The Manitoba legislation operates in much the same way as both
the PIPEDA and the general and statutory laws of Quebec. It prohibits the
collection of personal information about an individual unless the
information is collected for a "lawful" purpose."2 9 This is presumably
similar to saying that the collection of personal information will be
authorized only for "appropriate," "legitimate," and "serious" purposes.
Moreover, similarly to the laws of Quebec and the PIPEDA, the Manitoba
legislation limits the collection of information to that which is "reasonably
necessary" to accomplishing the lawful objective.'3" An advantage of the
Manitoba legislation is that it was expressly designed to regulate the
collection, use, and disclosure of personal health information, including
genetic information.13' A significant disadvantage, however, is that instead
of attaching protection to the health information itself, the provisions of the
legislation apply only to "trustees," a term which has been narrowly defined
as encompassing health professionals, health facilities, public bodies, and
health service agencies that collect or maintain personal health
information.12 The Manitoba legislation would therefore not restrict the
collection of personal health information by employers and insurers.
2. The United States
Many American states have enacted laws that explicitly prohibit
employment and insurance discrimination on the basis of genetic
predispositions. While these laws were enacted to compensate for the
arguablyweak measures that are made available by federal legislation, they
are nevertheless subject to the critique of genetic exceptionalism discussed
above, since they apply specifically to genetic information rather than to
127Ibid., s. 91 (while the penalty associated with a first offence ranges between $1000 and
S 10,000, the penalty associated with a second offence ranges between $10,000 and $20,000).
128 See discussion inPart V.A, Common and Equitable Laws, infra.
12 9 Health Information Act, supra note 123, s. 13(1).
I" Ibid., s. 13(2).
131Ibid., s. I(1) (defining "personal health information" as including "recorded information
about an identifiable individual that relates to the individual's health, or health care history, including
genetic information about the individual").
132 Ibid.
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health information generally. In many instances, the actual scope of the
privacy protection granted in any given state depends largely on how
broadly that state has defined 'genetic information.' For instance, while
some states have defined genetic information as encompassing information
which may be derived from chromosomal, DNA, or RNA analysis, other
states have adopted a broader definition that would include information
that can be gathered through routine laboratory tests indicating the
presence or absence of gene products as well as family history data.
A further constraint on state law protections against health
insurance discrimination is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(EmSA). 33 The ERISA pre-empts state laws that attempt to regulate self-
insured employee health plans.' " Thus, employees deriving their health
insurance from self-insured employers-employers that finance their own
health plans--would not be covered by prohibitions of insurance
discrimination based on genetic predispositions. Various permutations of
state legislation are currently available. These are not mutually exclusive
and, in any given state, one or more of the forms of legislation may be
available. Three main types of laws will be noted: (1) legislation prohibiting
discrimination in relation to particular genetic traits; (2) legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of the results of genetic testing; and
(3) legislation prohibiting discrimination in relation to genetic information.
Beginning with laws prohibiting discrimination in relation to
particular genetic traits, the first state to take legislative action against
genetic discrimination was North Carolina, which in 1975 prohibited
employers from discriminating on the basis of the sickle cell or hemoglobin
C anemia traits."'3 Other jurisdictions soon followed by enacting their own
trait-specific legislation. New York law, for instance, expressly prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of the sickle cell, Tay-Sachs, or
Cooley's anemia traits.' 6 Similarly, New Jersey law prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of the sickle cell, hemoglobin C, thalassemia,
Tay-Sachs, or cystic fibrosis traits.3 7 Trait-specific laws offer highly
circumscribed legal protection. Although they outlaw discriminatory
133 Employee Retirement Income SecurityAct, 29 U,.C § IC 1-1461 (1994).
134 Ibid., § 1144 (1994).
135"Genetic Information and the Workplace," sura note 20 at 1755.
136 New York Civil Rights Law, § 4S, online: WL (NY CIV RTS). Differential treatment on the
basis of these traits is only permissible where it "can be clearly shown that a peron's unique genetic
disorder would prevent such person from performing the particular job." :'d., § 4S-a.
137 New Jersey Civil Rights Lawi, § 10:5-5(x), 10:54,7 online: WL (NJST) [h renaftcrNreoJersey 
.
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practices in relation to certain specified genetic traits, they are usually silent
with respect to the collection side of the equation, and could not therefore
be used to prevent employers from collecting the trait-specific information
in the first place. Even worse, these laws offer no protection whatsoever,
whether at the collection or the use stage, when it comes to genetic traits
that are not expressly identified in the legislation.
The second category of laws prohibits discrimination on the basis
of information that is obtained from genetic testing. Texas law, for instance,
prohibits employers from discharging or refusing to hire an individual on
the procedural ground that the individual refuses to submit to genetic
testing.' 38 What is more, substantive discrimination is prohibited in
circumstances where the individual decides to acquiesce to his or her
employer's request for the disclosure of genetic information. 39 The term
genetic information is defined by the Texas Labor Code as information
derived from the results of a genetic test t40 which is in turn defined as "a
laboratory test of an individual's DNA, RNA, proteins, or chromosomes to
identify by analysis of the DNA, RNA, proteins, or chromosomes the genetic
mutations or alterations in the DNA, RNA, proteins, or chromosomes that
are associated with a predisposition for a clinically recognized disease or
disorder.', 141 This definition would not encompass other predictive
information such as family history data. In addition to the anti-
discrimination provisions, the legislation protects the confidentiality of the
collected information by imposing on employers the obligation of obtaining
informed and written consent of individuals prior to disclosing their
personal information. 4 2 While this source-specific legislation is more
inclusive than trait-specific legislation, it would not prohibit employers
from discriminating on the basis of genetic information obtained from
sources other than such testing. 43 Moreover, although the legislation
protects the confidentiality of genetic information that has been collected
by employers and prohibits illegitimate uses of such information by them,
it does not address the primary issue of whether such collection is justified
in the first place.
138 § 21.402(a)(2), online: WL (TX LABOR).
139 Ibid., § 21.402(a)(1).
140 Ibid., § 21.401(2).
141 Ibid., § 21.401(3).
4 Ibid., § 21.403(a)(b).
143"Genetic Information and the Workplace," supra note 20.
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The final category of state legislation prohibits discrimination in
relation to genetic information. New Jersey law, for example, makes it
unlawful for employers to refuse to hire, to require to retire, or to discharge
an individual on the basis of the individual's genetic information-which
information cannot be obtained without the individual's prior informed
consent --or on the basis of the individual's refusal to submit to genetic
testing."' Employers are additionally prohibited from discriminatingon the
basis of an individual's genetic information in the compensation, terms,
privileges, and conditions of employment. 4 ' As in the case of the HMPAA,
genetic information is broadly defined in the legislation as information
"about genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that may derive
from an individual or family member."14 7 Thus, unlike the source-specific
laws that focus on genetic testing aldne, the New Jersey legislation could
arguably be interpreted as preventing discrimination on the basis of family
history data and other predictive information. New York law also prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of genetic information regardless
of the source from which that information was derived. 4 ' Like the source-
specific laws, however, this final category of legislation, the most
comprehensive genetic discrimination legislation that is available in the
United States, is silent with respect to the initial collection of such
information by employers and insurers.
An individual who is discharged or not hired after having disclosed
irrelevant health information pursuant to an employer's mandatory or
discretionary disclosure policy could elect to sue the employer on the
ground of discrimination. Causation requirements would nevertheless be
an impediment to recovery since the individual would need to show that the
lost employment opportunity was based on an illegitimate consideration
such as genetic discrimination, rather than on merit, experience, or some
other valid cause. Similarly, an individual who is discharged or not hired
after having refused to disclose irrelevant health information would have
the burden of proving that it was the refusal to disclose, rather than a
relevant factor, that caused the lost employment opportunity.
144 NewJerst, supra note 137, § 10:545.
1 45 Ib&, § 10:5-12.
146 Ibid., § 10:5-12.
47 Ibid., § 10:5-5(o0).
14S New Imrk Executive Law, § 296(1)(a), 29221-b. 292,21-c, online: WL (NY EXEC),
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VII. CONCLUSION
We cannot and should not attempt to stop the rapidly expanding
use of genetic and other health information to benefit the health of our
society. However, a democratic and just society ought to minimize the
extent to which scientific advancement infringes upon the right to privacy
and permits discrimination against individuals by employers, insurance
companies, or others who may profit from the violation of those rights.
In light of the significant shortcomings of the existing common law,
statutory, and constitutional protections in the United States and Canada,
we propose the enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation that
adequately addresses each of the three pillars of the modem conception of
privacy rights: choice, secrecy, and confidentiality. Swift action is imperative
because the largest gap in privacy coverage relates not to re-disclosure of
our genetic and health information years down the road, but rather to
collection of that information today. Moreover, unless the public perceives
that the privacy of genetic and health information are adequately protected,
the disincentive for patients to be completely forthcoming with physicians
could result in bad medical decisions. 149 For these reasons, safeguarding the
right to privacy as it relates to genetic and health information is a justifiable
normative objective.
149 Individuals who believe that they can trust their health care professional to maintain the
confidentiality of the information that is imparted in the context of the doctor.patient relationship are
more likely to submit to medical tests, divulge sensitive information, or seek treatment. See, for
instance, R. Bayer & K.E. Toomey, "HiV Prevention and the Two Faces of Partner Notification"
(1992) 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 1158. Conversely, individuals who doubt the confidence of the doctor-
patient relationship may avoid medical tests, fail to disclose pertinent medical information or simply
avoid medical care altogether. For instance, the CMA explicitly recognizes the adverse health
consequences that can result from a lack of trust on the part of patients in relation to health care
providers. See CMA, supra note 28 (section 2.2(d) states "were it not for the reputation of health
professionals for trustworthiness and the expectation that information disclosed to them will be held
in confidence, patients would be less willing to confide health information fully and truthfully in the
therapeutic context"; and section 2.2(e) states "to the extent that provisions for health information
inhibit patients from confiding health information fully and truthfully, their care will be adversely
affected"). See also J. Dawson, "Compelled Production of Medical Records" (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 25
at 47, which notes the difficulties associated with judicially mandated disclosures of health information:
Therapy may be abandoned if confidential material is released, adversely affecting the patient's
health. Clinicians who are aware of the possibilities of forced disclosure may feel obliged to warn
patients at the outset, compromising communication between them. Note-taking may be affected,
even to the extent that a therapist refuses to keep official records. If a professional is subpoenaed
to testify, the expert may be forced to choose between the health needs of the patient and
imprisonment for contempt.
